# NIGERIAN STORED PRODUCTS RESEARCH INSTITUTE

## DRAFT

## ON

## ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY

## FEBRUARY, 2024

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This policy sets out the position of Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute (NSPRI) in relation to anti-terrorism laws and regulation that the Institute, and Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN) are subject to. It provides an overview of activities and expectations with regard to ensuring that the Institute operates within the laws of Nigeria as a nation, as well as the laws of other jurisdictions that become relevant through any aspect of the Institute's engagements. This document concisely chronicled causes of terrorism and discuss strategies that are quite simple, unambiguous and achievable in countering the challenge. It also objectively points out the roles of major stakeholders such as Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), and individuals in facilitating the implementation of this policy with the view to reducing the risks from terrorism and create an environment that encourage the people to go about their normal professions and businesses with confidence.

**SECTION I**

**1. INTRODUCTION**

This policy provides an overview of activities and expectations with respect to ensuring that the Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute operates within the laws of Nigeria as a nation, as well as the laws of other jurisdictions that become relevant through any aspect of the Institute's work and engagement. It projects out Nigerian Stored Products Research Institutes' (NSPRI's) position in relation to anti-terrorism laws and regulation that the Institute and its Trustees (Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria) are subject to. The policy also provides colleagues with advice on how to navigate broad and sometimes complex anti-terrorism laws where they present a greater risk than usual within research projects and other activity undertaken by the Institute. Any breaches of anti-terrorism laws may lead to serious consequences for NSPRI, including custodial sentences for staff in addition to fines and consequential reputational damage. It is on this premise that this policy is written in such away to supplements the existing and any other forthcoming guidance and papers under the umbrella theme of collaborations, conducting research in high-risk settings and those under the auspices of authoritarian governments. In conformity with the global standards, the primary laws of relevance regarding the activity of the Institute with regards to antiterrorism are: Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 of Nigeria, Nigerian National Counter-terrorism Strategy, 2016 (NACTEST), UK Terrorism Act 2000; the Terrorist Freezing Act 2010; and the UK Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.

In recent years, Nigeria has wrestled with the multifaceted challenge of domestic terrorism, posing a significant threat to its national security and stability. The emergence and multiplication of various extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Independent People of Biafra (IPOB), Unknown Gunmen and terrorized kidnapper's groups have underscored the urgent need for a robust and comprehensive domestic counterterrorism strategy. This introduction provides an overview of the current state of domestic terrorism in Nigeria, emphasizing the complexities of the threat landscape and the imperative for coordinated and adaptive responses from the government,

security forces, and the broader society. The struggle of Nigeria against domestic terrorism which of course NSPRI is a component is rooted in a complex interplay of historical, socio-economical, and political factors. The Boko Haram insurgency, which originated in the early 2000s, has evolved into a protracted conflict with devastating consequences for both human lives and collateral. The group's radical ideology, marked by a distorted interpretation of Islam, has fueled a relentless campaign of violence against civilians, security forces, and government institutions. In response to the evolving threat, the Nigerian government has implemented various counterterrorism measures, including military operations, intelligence gathering, and international collaborations. Despite these efforts, challenges persist, requiring a nuanced understanding of the socio-political landscape, community engagement, and the development of targeted strategies to address root causes and vulnerabilities.

Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute (NSPRI) must comply with the regulations and the statutory powers of Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN) which can be exercised in parallel to counter-terrorism laws of regions within its jurisdiction. Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria's (ARCN) guidance should be generally cautious and broad-brush in nature with an emphasis on ensuring that Research Institutes should not be benefitting terrorist organizations, financially or otherwise. A key principle of this policy document is that it provides guidance on the duty of Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria's (ARCN) and staff of NSPRI to ensure that their operations 'must not engage in conduct or activities which would lead to a situation where a reasonable member of the public will conclude that the Institute is associated with a proscribed organization or terrorism generally'. This places a broader responsibility on the Institute and its management team since the inference is that no crime must be alleged or committed which would necessitate Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN) to take concern over any incidents that may arise. Holistically, the Institute, its management team and Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN) should ensure that proper guidance is provided which include the following:

- Comply with the laws, including counter-terrorism legislation.
- Act in the Institute's best interest, avoid exposing it to undue risk and make sure assets are used only to support its research or intended purposes.
- Take reasonable steps to ensure that the Institute's premises, assets, staff, volunteers and other resources cannot be used for activities that may, or appear to, support or condone terrorism or terrorist activities.
- Ensure that effective procedures are in place and properly implemented to prevent terrorist organizations taking advantage of the Institute's status, reputation, facilities or assets.
- Take immediate steps to dissociate the Institute from any activity that may give, or appear to give, support to terrorism or terrorist activity.
- Take all reasonable steps to ensure that the Institute's activities are open and transparent so that these cannot be misinterpreted.
- Exercise proper control over the Institute's financial affairs and safeguard its assets.

NSPRI Anti-Terrorism Policy seeks to shed light on the critical components of NSPRI's domestic counterterrorism efforts. It will explore the role of intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the self-aversion strategies in confronting the terrorist threat. Additionally, the importance of a comprehensive approach that integrates socio-economic development, education, research and development (R & D) and community resilience will be highlighted. By delving into the dynamics of domestic terrorism in Nigeria, this exploration aims at laying the foundation for subsequent discussions on policy recommendations, local and international collaborations, and the imperative of fostering a resilient and united front against terrorism within the office territories and office facilities across the regions/zones of the country.

## 1.1    Global Overview

Terrorism remains a pervasive and complex global challenge that transcends borders, affecting nations and communities across the world. The dynamic nature of terrorist threats, coupled with evolving tactics and ideologies, demands a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted landscape. This overview seeks to provide a glimpse into the current state of global terrorism, examining key challenges, emerging trends, and international responses. Terrorism manifests in various forms, perpetrated by a range of actors with diverse motivations. Non-state entities, such as transnational extremist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS), coexist with ideologically driven nationalist or separatist movements. Cyber terrorism, lone-wolf attacks, and state-sponsored terrorism further contribute to the intricate tapestry of threats faced by the international community. Ideological underpinnings of terrorism often stem from political, religious, or socio-economic grievances. Extremist ideologies, whether religious fundamentalism or ethno-nationalism, provide a framework for radicalization and recruitment, fostering a sense of purpose among individuals and groups seeking to advance their agenda through violence.;'

## 1.2    Globalization of Terrorism

The interconnected nature of the modern world has facilitated the globalization of terrorism. Communication technologies, ease of travel, and online platforms enable the rapid dissemination of extremist ideologies, recruitment, and coordination of attacks across borders. This globalization poses challenges to national security and necessitates enhanced international cooperation to counteract the cross-border nature of terrorist activities. It is on this note that cyber-terrorism and hybrid threats surfaced. The digital age has given rise to cyber-terrorism, wherein malicious actors exploit vulnerabilities in cyberspace to disrupt critical infrastructure, spread propaganda, and coordinate attacks. Hybrid threats, combining conventional and unconventional tactics, underscore the need for adaptive and technologically advanced counterterrorism strategies.

However, the global nature of terrorism demands coordinated responses from the international community. Initiatives such as United Nations Security Council resolutions, intelligence sharing, and collaborative efforts to address root causes of terrorism underscore the importance of multilateral cooperation in mitigating the threat. As the global landscape continues to evolve, understanding the intricacies of terrorism becomes paramount for

policymakers, security forces, and communities worldwide. This overview sets the stage for a nuanced exploration of regional variations, emerging threats, and the imperative of fostering international collaborations to counteract the ever-changing dynamics of terrorism.

## 1.3    Domestic Threat

Nigeria faces a persistent and intricate domestic threat of terrorism, primarily fueled by the activities of extremist groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The complex socio-political landscape, historical tensions, and economic disparities contribute to the challenges in addressing this menace. This exploration aims to delve into the specific dynamics of the domestic terrorism threat in Nigeria, highlighting key challenges and ongoing efforts to counteract and mitigate the impact on the nation.

## 1.4    Boko Haram Insurgency

At the core of Nigeria's domestic terrorism challenge lies the Boko Haram insurgency, which emerged in the early 2000s. This Islamist extremist group, with its roots in northeastern Nigeria, has expanded its influence across borders, posing a significant threat to regional stability. Boko Haram's brutal tactics, including mass abductions, suicide bombings, and attacks on civilian populations, have left an indelible mark on the nation's security landscape.

## 1.5    ISWAP and Factional Dynamics

The splintering of Boko Haram gave rise to ISWAP, a faction that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS). The existence of multiple factions and shifting alliances within these extremist groups adds a layer of complexity to counterterrorism efforts. Understanding the dynamics of these factions is crucial for mapping out effective strategies to address the evolving threat landscape.

## 2.6    Root Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

The domestic terrorism landscape in Nigeria is deeply rooted in socio-economic disparities, marginalization, and governance challenges. Issues such as poverty, unemployment, and inadequate infrastructure create fertile ground for recruitment into proscribed groups and engagement in radicalization. Addressing these root causes is essential for developing sustainable solutions to counter domestic terrorism.

In a broader sense, root causes of terrorism in Nigeria are complex and multifaceted, starting from a combination of historical, socio-economical, political, and cultural factors. Identifying these root causes is essential for developing effective strategies to address and mitigate the underlying issues that contribute to the perpetuation of terrorism. Some key root causes include:

### (a) Historical Grievances

Historical grievances, particularly related to colonialism and the creation of artificial borders, have contributed to tensions among ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria. Perceived

marginalization and historical injustices have fueled resentment and provided a breeding ground for extremist ideologies.

## (b) Ethnic and Religious Divides

Nigeria is ethnically and religiously diverse, with a population comprising various groups. Ethnic and religious tensions have been exploited by extremist groups, leading to conflicts and acts of terrorism. Competition for resources and power often exacerbates these divides.

## (c) Socio-Economic Inequalities

Widespread poverty, unemployment, and economic disparities, particularly in certain regions, create conditions conducive to the recruitment of individuals into these proscribed groups. Lack of access to education and economic opportunities can leave segments of the population vulnerable to extremist ideologies.

## (d) Governance Challenges

Weak governance, corruption, and ineffective institutions have contributed to a sense of disillusionment among the populace. When people perceive their government as corrupt or unresponsive to their needs, it can create fertile ground for dissatisfaction and support for radical movements.

## (e) Security Force Abuses

Allegations of human rights abuses by security forces in counterterrorism operations can contribute to grievances within communities. Reports of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and other abuses can alienate communities and generate sympathy for or support of extremist groups.

## (f) Youth Radicalization

High levels of youth unemployment, coupled with a lack of educational opportunities, can make young people susceptible to radicalization. Extremist groups often target disaffected youths, offering a sense of purpose, identity, and empowerment through participation in their activities.

## (g) Regional Conflicts and Instability

The presence of regional conflicts, such as the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern part of the country, has contributed to the instability of the region and the ripple effect on the country at large. Cross-border movements of extremist groups and the spillover of violence from neighboring regions exacerbate the security situation.

## (h) Lack of Inclusive Dialogue

Insufficient efforts toward inclusive dialogue and conflict resolution can degenerate into a situation whereby citizens will resort to self-help. A good example of this is the southern Kaduna crisis, the IPOB and the Fulani-Agatu conflict in Benue State, among others.

### 1.7    Impact on Citizens

The impact of domestic terrorism extends beyond the immediate security concerns, affecting civilian populations in profound ways. Displacement, loss of lives, disruption of education, and economic setbacks are among the far-reaching consequences.

### SECTION II

### 2.1    Impact of Terrorism on Economic Growth and Development

Terrorism has significant and detrimental effects on economic growth and development. The impact is multifaceted, affecting various sectors and aspects of a nation's economy. Some of the key ways in which terrorism impeded economic growth and development in Nigeria include disruption of economic activities. In the recent years, several attacks were launched on critical infrastructure like transportation networks, power grids and other government facilities. The consequence of this loss is not limited to regressive economic outlook as we are experiencing it today but, extended to investment deterrence, loss of human capital, increase in security expenditure, reduced foreign direct investment, and loss of confidence in bureaucratic administration of the country.

### 2.2    How Terrorism affect Government Agencies

Terrorism can have multidimensional effects on government agencies, impacting their functionality, priorities, resources, and relationships with the public. The consequences vary depending on the nature and severity of the terrorist threat. One of the known strategies of terrorism is to destabilize, disorganize and distort the relative peace of an organization and a deliberate shift in government priorities. Terrorism also affects agencies in the area of budgeting.  Governments often respond to terrorism by allocating significant resources to enhance security measures. This includes increased funding for intelligence agencies, law enforcement, border control, and counterterrorism efforts. The additional expenditures can strain government budgets and affect allocations for other critical sectors. The need to address terrorism may lead to reallocations of resources within government agencies. Funds may be diverted from routine operations or developmental projects to support counterterrorism efforts and affecting the overall functioning of government programs. Agencies may be compelled to redirect resources and personnel toward counterterrorism initiatives, sometimes at the expense of other important areas such as healthcare, education, infrastructure development, food safety and security.

### 2.3    Terrorism and Agricultural Activities

Terrorism has negative impacts on agricultural activities, with an attendant effect on the productivity, postharvest value chain and food security. Disruptions in agricultural activities due to terrorism often leads to insecurity and disruptions in rural areas where agricultural activities predominantly take place. Farmers may face challenges in accessing their farm land, leading to decreased agricultural productivity. Disruption in postharvest activities due to terrorism sends negative signals to the entire postharvest value chain development and food security. Disrupted planting and harvesting seasons can undermine the data and samples

collected for postharvest research. In terms of infrastructural damages, terrorist attacks may target critical infrastructure such as transportation networks, storage facilities, and processing plants. Damage to these facilities can disrupt the smooth flow postharvest value chain, hinder data collection, and impede the application of innovative postharvest technologies. In regions affected by terrorism, farmers may be reluctant to invest in modern postharvest technologies or adopt advanced practices due to uncertainty and insecurity. Governments in regions grappling with terrorism may prioritize security and counterterrorism efforts over other sectors, including agricultural research. Reduced funding for agricultural research can limit the resources available for postharvest studies, constraining the development and implementation of evolving postharvest technologies. Terrorism can lead to the disruption of market access for agricultural products. Insecurity and instability may result in restricted transportation routes, limiting the ability of farmers to get their produce to markets. This, in turn, affects the availability of fresh produce for postharvest studies and reduced profit for farmers.

## 2.4    International Collaboration Challenges

Ongoing terrorism and insecurity create an environment of uncertainty and risk aversion. This can discourage private sector investment in agriculture and agribusiness, limiting the resources available for research and development in postharvest technologies. Terrorism can strain diplomatic and economic relations between nations. International collaboration on postharvest research may be hindered by geopolitical tensions, limiting the exchange of knowledge probably through staff exchange programme, technology, and resources.

## 2.5    Terrorism and Activities of Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute

NSPRI has a significant component of research in Nigeria and in particular, postharvest research having drawn her regulatory framework from the National Mandate has a tendency to be directly or indirectly affected by the scourge of terrorism. Apart from theft, burglary and robbery, no direct terrorism attack was recorded on the soil of NSPRI but, indirect terrorism like kidnapping of field officers were recorded in the recent times. However, some of the potential ways terrorism could affect NSPRI as a postharvest research institute are discussed below:

### (i)  Disruption of Operations

Acts of terrorism can disrupt normal operations, leading to closures or delays in research activities. Security incidents, such as bombings, may damage facilities and equipment, resulting in a temporary or prolonged halt to research projects. This disruption can affect the continuity and progress of ongoing research.

### (ii) Loss of Talent

Terrorism can create an environment of fear and instability, potentially making researchers, scientists, and other skilled professionals to leave the affected region or institute. The loss of talent can have long-term consequences for the research institute, impacting its ability to conduct high-quality postharvest research.

Terrorism may lead to restrictions on travel and communication, making it difficult for researchers to collaborate with international partners or attend conferences. Limited collaboration and networking opportunities can hinder the exchange of knowledge, ideas, and technologies that are crucial for the progress of postharvest research.

### (iii) Increased Costs of Risk Management

Postharvest research institutes may need to allocate additional resources for risk management strategies and insurance coverage due to the heightened risks associated with terrorism. This can further strain financial resources that could otherwise be directed towards research initiatives.

## SECTION III

### 3.1 Preventive Mechanisms of Terrorism in Nigerian Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of government

The concept of terrorism is relatively new in Nigeria although activities related to terrorism were recorded in the 1950s and early 1980s which were carried out by religious extremist groups in Kano state known as the "maitasine". In preventing terrorism and terrorist related activities, government ministries, departments and agencies including the Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute (NSPRI) must key into the national action plan for the prevention and eradication of terrorism and terrorist related activities as contained in the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTES) document.

The institute can support efforts of the Nigerian government aimed at preventing terrorism and terrorist related activities in the following ways;

(A)Reworking the recruitment processes and policies in government owned ministries, departments and agencies to reflect the current security situation of the country. There is need to internally review, and or come up with necessary measures that will enhance the institute to run a proper background check of her staff and especially the new enrollee with the view to identifying, unraveling and curbing the infiltrations of terrorist, terrorist financiers, sympathizers and affiliates among the civil and public service of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

 (B) The MDAs must work towards the protection of its critical assets by putting in place internal security mechanism to curb the vulnerabilities of her staff members and other infrastructures to terrorist attacks through the collaboration with relevant security agencies of the government and other stake holders.

(C) The MDAs especially the research institutions must ensure adequate support for government's fight against terrorism and its prevention through collaboration of the relevant security agencies by synergizing in the area of training, research and innovation that are germane to successful eradication of the outlawed groups from the Nigerian territory.

(D)The MDAs of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria must synergize on modalities to promote culture of dialogue, deliberation and mutual co- habitation and create a robust inter agency collaboration for effective dissemination, implementation and domestication of relevant government policies especially as it relates to terrorism and terrorists' activities in Nigeria.

(E) Government owned MDAs must be alert in term of service delivery in line with their respective mandates as the optimal functionalities of government agencies are crucial in the fight against terrorism. The role of the Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute in the fight against terrorism and eradication of terrorist activities in Nigeria is very crucial when adequate attention is given to our mandate of preventing post-harvest losses at ensuring food sufficiency in the country. Hunger and poverty have been identified as the basic tools used by the terrorist in targeting and recruiting unsuspecting vulnerable citizens into their folds. Development of adequate storage facilities and proper orientation around the nooks and crannies of Nigeria will not only help in curbing post-harvest losses but also create employment for the teaming youths thereby reducing their vulnerability to unlawful association.

(F) The creation of automated crime register in the government owned MDAs has become very crucial at this time, this register if well managed can serve as a crime information bank among sister agencies of government which can be useful in the area of intelligence sharing, crime prevention, control, tracking and reduce the movement of criminals swapping between government agencies which may be in form of transfer of service and other related services available in the government civil and public service in Nigeria.

## SECTION IV

### 4.1 Implementation of NSPRI's Counter-terrorism Policy Document

Terrorism is one of the most serious security threats to the collective existence of Nigerians with its impact cutting across all sectors and strata of government. The fight against terrorism is therefore the concern of all citizens including the MDAs and other relevant organizations playing various roles to achieve the government's purpose. The Nigerian Stored Products Research Institute being an agency of government must also key into these policies of counterterrorism as enshrined in the NACTEST (2016) and Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022 policy document on counterterrorism and other relevant laws of the land. All the MDAs must play their various roles to counteract terrorism.

### 4.2 Role of Management

The roles of the Institutes' management include the following:

(A) The management should come up with more effective modalities in the screening during recruitment exercise in line with current security realities. This is obtainable through the collection of relevant data and investigation of same. Collaboration with relevant security agencies of government is another way of getting the background

information of staff and applicants and eliminate those with records of crimes and criminalities.

(B) Automation of staff identification cards, this will prevent duplication, unauthorized printing and reprinting, reproduction, and impersonation which can damage the reputation of the agency.

(C) Engagement of reputable security organization in the management of the internal security of the institute and collaboration with such company (s) in the areas of procurement of modern security gadgets, training and retraining of security personnel, regular patrol and surveillance, intelligence gathering and sharing in order to curtail the activities of criminals.

(D) Implementation and enforcement of all extant laws, policies, rules and regulation of the country aimed at reducing, eradicating, and curtailing acts of terrorism and related crimes within the institute.

(E) The management should put in place mechanisms to strengthen internal intelligence gathering through the effective and efficient utilization of the Servicom unit, encouraging 'whistle blowing' among staff, building cordial relationship with relevant security agencies, host and border communities.

(F) Prioritization of staff welfare by the management is another way of promoting staff wellbeing and gaining staff trust, commitment and loyalty. Staff will also perform optimally and demonstrate total commitment not only to the institute but to the nation when their welfare is prioritized.

(G) The management is to design policies and programs that will educate members of staff on the need to collaborate with all relevant agencies in the fight against terrorism.

## 4.3 Role of Staff

To ensure the safety and peaceful coexistence among members of staff in environment devoid of rancor and anxiety, staffs are expected to be supportive to management's efforts aimed at actualizing the implementation of relevant government policies and programs. Staff' are expected to:

(A) Obey rules, regulations and align with the policies and programs of the institute as a call to duty. Staff must be ready to carry out all officially assigned roles by relevant authorities within the institute, this will help in realization of the institute's goals.

(B) Staff should make use of the dispute resolution channels as may be contained in relevant extant laws such Public Service Rules (PSR).

(C) Act in best interest of the institutes' to protect its image by simply aligning with institute's policies. Staff members are admonished to be good ambassadors of the institute.

(D) Staff members are to embrace the whistle blowing policies to provide useful information and intelligence to the 'institute security committee' as recommended and management for onward perusal and utilization.

(E) Staff members can also play the role of educating the public beginning with members of the respective families and neighborhood on the dangers of associating, promoting, sympathizing, financing and affiliating with terrorist organization and activities. This should be done as a civic responsibility by all members of staff.

## SECTION V

## 5. CONCLUSION

Terrorism is a major security threat starring at Nigeria in the face with an attendant effect on the insecurity of lives, food and properties of the citizens. This document clearly discusses adequate precautionary measures. The need to develop adequate information sharing systems in order to enhance synergy amongst the security agencies cannot be overemphasized. The implementation of this policy should be holistic in nature, collaboration with relevant security agencies as well as other governmental and non-governmental organizations. The staff and management of the Institute are to read, understand the clauses of this policy and adhere to the requirement and provisions of anti-terrorism laws and the laws of their jurisdiction.

## 5.1 RECOMMENDATION(S)

The following recommendations are suggested for the Institute:

1. Special oversight committee headed by a coordinator on security matters should be constituted.
2. Improve synergy between security agencies and NSPRI in the prevention and countering of violent extremist, terrorism and terrorism financing.
3. Project Risk Register should also be created to serve as guide to officer carrying out research projects in areas noted with high terrorism risk.
4. Partnering with Civil Society Organizations and Nigerian public in zones where the Institute is having zonal offices to provide necessary education (training and retraining), support, information, awareness and sensitization to the Institutes' staff with regards to the prevention and elimination of acts of terrorism, terrorism financing, proliferation and proliferation financing.
5. Procurement and installation of modern security equipment such as CCTV, and other surveillance equipment for intelligence gathering.
6. Creation and regular updating of crime register.
7. The staff should familiarize themselves with travel and security policy document of countries within their jurisdiction.

# COMMITTEE MEMBERS

| S/No. | NAME(S) | DEPARTMENT/ASSOCIATION |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Dr. John Praise Alimi | CHAIRPERSON/DCRD |
| 2. | Mrs. S. Ibrahim | Admin |
| 3. | Dr. P. Orimafo | ROD |
| 4. | Mr. Haruna | CSO/Admin |
| 5. | Engr. (Dr.) S. Kamaldeen | PHERD |
| 6. | Mr. J. O. Shuaib | Admin/Secretary/SSA |
| 7 | Dr. M. Aremu | DCRD/ASURI |
| 8. | Mr. O. Anjorin | Admin/NASU |